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What’s happening to the public sphere?  
 
Opening Keynote Lecture, as delivered to the Annual Conference of the Media, 
Communication and Cultural Studies Association 2019, held at the University of Stirling, 
9-11 January 2019.  
 
Philip Schlesinger, University of Glasgow 
 
Today, I’d like to point to challenges we presently face in discussing the public sphere. It’s 
clear to me that the agenda is far bigger than can be addressed in half an hour’s talk. So I’ve 
selected issues that strike me as important and illuminating, all too aware of what’s been left 
out.  
 
Given where we are, I’d like to focus most on Europe and the UK, and inevitably, glance across 
the Atlantic at the USA, in ways that I hope have wider resonance. And I’ll close with some 
words on Scotland. 
 
Politics matters  
Sixty years ago, deeply influenced by classical Greek political thought, Hannah Arendt 
reminded us that entry into ‘the public realm’ meant stepping into collectively experienced time 
and a world that we hold in common with others. This mattered profoundly, she argued, 
because it offered ‘a guarantee against the futility of individual life’. The classic polis or res 
publica, Arendt noted, was ‘the space […] reserved for the relative permanence […] of 
mortals.’1 It’s important to recall the fundamental importance of our political activity for what 
Arendt called ‘the human condition’. Politics is an index of who we are, what we might be, and 
how we might effect change.2 
 
The public sphere is a spatial metaphor; it’s a construct, the outcome of collective artifice; it’s 
used to some extent in general discourse; it has a material existence in the shape of political 
actors and institutional life; it offers a normative position in difficult times. In a democratic 
order, arguably the public sphere is still the primary locus of political communication and of 
the strategies and tactics that characterise this kind of activity.  
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When we don the garb of citizenship, we take on a publicly defined identity, encountering 
rights and obligations in terms that are not of our choosing. In some regimes we may be able 
to question and try to change the political order; in others we simply may not. These wider 
conditions of openness and closure determine the scope of what it is to be a citizen of a given 
state.  
 
A key question, insistently at the heart of contemporary politics, is what it means to be a 
competent citizen – what counts as pertinent knowledge for action, and how might it be used 
in voting, demonstrating, lobbying, associating, or otherwise trying to influence the political 
process. The mediation of political discourse, the role of experts, and the uses of evidence at 
times of ideological division – all are currently in question. Relations between cognition and 
emotion are now centre stage. In a nutshell, is an ideal-typical model of Enlightenment political 
rationality now passé?  
 
The public sphere is always structured in terms of prevalent power relations. So the analytical 
task is to understand how these work. The normative question is whether we think an open 
communicative space is a crucial good that’s necessary to a democratic politics. In ideal-typical 
terms, openness versus closure has long been the frame for debates about the domestic 
performance of the press and broadcasting in representative democracies. It’s been the basis 
for classifying political regimes and media systems, as in the well-known comparative study 
by Dan Hallin and Paolo Mancini.3 Classification of media as free or unfree was a constant of 
the Cold War period and its opposed political systems. Yet the ideological relevance of such 
classification did not disappear with the collapse of the soviet bloc. It lives on. 
 
To date, the pre-internet role of media in constituting public discourse – focused on the national 
press and broadcasting – has largely shaped debate about the mediated public sphere. The terms 
have shifted, though, with the advent of the digital age. Analysis has extended to how the 
digitisation of cultural content and the workings of a global platform economy have changed 
power relations.4  
 
Manuel Castell’s decade-old study of ‘communication power’ captured this turning-point. 
Focused on how power was ‘constructed around digital networks of communication’, it 
analysed ‘the interaction between mainstream media and the Internet […]’ as typifying ‘media 
politics in the digital age’.5 Castells’ techno-utopianism is out of temper with the times. But 
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his overall agenda was well judged. It pointed to the crisis of democracy, the gap between 
communication and representation, and a drift to ‘insurgent parties’. Notably, Castells analysed 
the role of emotion in shaping political judgement, describing electorates’ capacity to reject 
evidence and to embrace questionable leadership candidates. These insights are relevant for 
present debate about the UK’s referendum over EU membership and the election of President 
Trump, and many other leaders. 
 
Whither Europe? 
Since the 1970s, Jürgen Habermas’s early work has been the starting-point for discussing the 
public sphere.6 It described the invention of relatively unconstrained spaces for public 
discourse – critical locations, based in civil society, not captured by the state and official 
political power. Importantly, those spaces were national. Struggles for inclusion broadened 
institutional politics, so that whole nations on the road to representative democracy became 
general publics. This so-called ‘Westphalian’ model – named after the peace treaty of 1648 – 
refers to the sovereign territorial state.7 Who has or does not have a voice in the public sphere 
is a live issue. It’s at the heart of debates about inclusion and exclusion. These have focused 
most on class, gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, and religion. The politics of expanded 
recognition brings new complexity in its wake, in the shape of contending identities, values 
and memories.  
 
The European Union has exemplified the major shifts in conceptions of the communicative 
space.8 Thirty years ago Habermas first considered how the EU might become a public sphere 
– a boundary-transcending community for the component nations and cultures of the European 
project. Seeing this as a cosmopolitan possibility, Habermas’s theory broadened to 
accommodate the digital age. It addressed how border-transcending networks facilitated by 
communications technologies, powered by the internet, were changing how publics might be 
conceived.9 For well over a decade, and this was of great interest to the European Commission, 
the European public sphere became a major research project in political communication. A key 
issue was whether there could be a European demos, a political community facilitated by media 
and communications.  
 
That was a step change. The EU’s origins, after all, were economic – its formation responded 
to the need for post-war reconstruction. But a fundamental benefit of the new common market, 
after the disaster of World War II, and previous major wars on the continent, was the 
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pacification through economic integration of France and Germany, and subsequently all the 
other states that joined the European Community.10 This is conveniently forgotten or rejected 
by many today, throughout Europe, but most tellingly in the UK. Some dismiss the focus on 
peace as merely the ideology of the technocratic elite that runs the EU.11 I think it goes much 
further and deeper for many EU citizens. 
 
The EU public sphere was a high water-mark of theoretical post-nationalism. Projections of a 
cosmopolitan order and construction of a global public sphere were widely aired in academic 
work in the social sciences and humanities. But there were also intimations of a dark side. After 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, tensions between civic and ethnic nationalism were already 
evident across the continent.12 In 1990, Habermas noted ‘right-wing xenophobic reactions’ to 
immigration ‘throughout Europe’.  
 
A decade or so ago, Habermas’s post-national vision was influentially questioned by Nancy 
Fraser. She thought his work had only ‘articulated a model of deliberative democracy for a 
territorially bounded polity’.13 How could this framework relate to a globalising world? Even 
if collaboration by international bodies and the rise of cross-border social movements pointed 
to increased global governance, Fraser wanted to know how a post-national public could obtain 
real leverage over the political and economic decisions taken in such ‘a post-Westphalian 
world’?14 Could a public sphere be both legitimate and effective when it became post-national? 
Fraser’s answer, actually just like Habermas’s own later thinking, was aspirational. She urged 
us to ‘envision new transnational public powers, which can be made accountable to new 
democratic transnational circuits of public opinion.’15 
 
A decade ago, contrariwise, I concluded that Europe’s cosmopolitan aspiration had fostered a 
perilous delusion.16 If there was a European public sphere, it was restricted to the decision-
making elites that ran the Euro-polity, those conducting single market business, and those that 
enjoyed privileged mobility across borders – including people like us, academics and students. 
These were specific rather than general publics. Their communicative spaces were, and still 
are, part and parcel of the ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU.  
 
Today, cosmopolitanism is on the back foot. We face widespread and naked reassertions of the 
national principle. The sheer difficulty of attaining the ideal of global governance – of 
establishing a relatively stable institutional matrix capable of addressing common problems – 
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is well illustrated by struggles to reach enforceable and enduring international agreements over 
climate change. These remain quite fragile.17 The political order on which much 
cosmopolitanism was premised has been subject to reverses. In Europe, like it or not, it 
implicitly rested on a continued pax Americana, with NATO as the military linchpin of the 
Atlantic alliance.  
 
In the present retreat from post-nationalism, the contours of the public sphere are being re-
militarised, both offensively and defensively. Evidence of Russian interference in US and other 
countries’ electoral processes is hard to dismiss.18 Representing an ‘America First’ coalition, 
President Trump’s hostility to the EU and equivocal attitude to NATO have thrown earlier 
assumptions about the alliance system into question. The accelerating shift towards 
polycentrism in international relations is also reshaping global geo-politics. Think of the 
economic and military rise of China and the incremental drift of some states towards a ‘new 
cold war’ with Russia. In Europe, the post-1989 map is gradually being redrawn.  
 
Faced by the aftermath of economic crisis and widespread hostile reactions to migration, the 
focus everywhere has shifted to how the public sphere is constituted within states. The 
shortcomings of democratic institutions in devising an equitable and solidary social order 
means that the theatre of the national is a conflict zone. 
 
Even if national public sphere questions have resumed their earlier relevance, the post-national 
potential has not just disappeared. It’s deeply embodied in many of us. But in the immediate 
future, it faces hard times.  
 
Populism and democracy 
Today’s political antagonisms have been widely attributed to the rise of populism, a term 
whose meanings vary greatly in academic, journalistic and general discourses. It’s been around 
since the late nineteenth century and while I don’t find the idea analytically useful presently it 
does carry considerable symbolic freight.  
 
Margaret Canovan’s classic study argued that populisms commonly emphasize antagonisms 
between an elite (seen as corrupt) and the people (seen as virtuous and heroic),  and that 
populisms also capitalise on widespread mistrust of political institutions.19 Jan-Werner 
Müller’s recent critical overview concurs.20  Relations between populism, fascism and Nazism 
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have been much debated, inconclusively. There have also been recurrent attempts at pursuing 
a left populism. The varied politics involved don’t readily fit a left-right political axis. 
Moreover, it’s often difficult to draw a line between say, established political parties in 
government and erstwhile insurgent movements. ‘Populism’ sometimes ends up describing 
regimes. I won’t address particular examples today but will consider some more general issues. 
 
The breakdown of party political loyalties in representative democracies – what political 
scientists call ‘de-alignment’ – has opened the road to growth in support for populist 
movements and parties. These are usually complex coalitions that cut across classes. In their 
study of Europe and the USA, Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin note populists’ common 
hostility to rapid and high levels of immigration, the social importance of lost group esteem 
and lack of voice, and perceived threats to cultural identity – especially how the ‘nation’ is 
imagined.21 
 
Political scientists differ over whether or not populism is compatible with representative 
democracy. Eatwell and Goodwin see populism as a ‘revolt against liberal democracy’ that 
needs to be listened to. They argue that mainstream political parties have hardened their 
policies, notably on immigration, and often become ‘populist-lite’ themselves. Müller also 
holds that populists’ disaffections draw attention to failings of representative democracies. He 
contends, though, that populists are anti-pluralist and a danger to democratic systems.22 In the 
end, the ‘containment’ or break-through of populist politics in taking state power is an 
empirical question. It depends on the strength of political institutions and the attractiveness of 
alternatives in play. Each case needs analysis on its own terms. 
 
Of course, populism is not new to our field, any more than it is to political science. In the 1980s, 
in a well-known critique of the ‘authoritarian populism’ of Margaret Thatcher’s governments, 
Stuart Hall and others associated with the ‘New Times’ project argued for a national populism 
of the left able to seize the ground of patriotism and consumerism.23 Today, forty-year-old 
arguments about the forward march of ‘left populism’ are back in circulation.24  
 
Currently, the decline of political civility,25 uncritical adulation of leaders, and mobilisation of 
extra-parliamentary movements are all attributed to populism. Contemporary populist political 
styles are forged by an ‘intensely mediated’ relationship between leaders and followers.26 
Changed modes of consumption and distribution in a platform economy, the slow reshaping of 
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the ‘legacy’ mediated public sphere of press, radio and TV, the challenge posed by political 
uses of social media – all interact with socio-political divisions in democracies to reframe our 
understanding of how a future public sphere may evolve.  
 
Jay Blumler has argued that the ‘crisis of communication for citizenship’ he discerns cannot 
be surmounted while there’s a relatively closed political class coupled with a widespread lack 
of trust by citizens.27 Moving into the gap in trust, the Trump phenomenon has contributed an 
exemplary lexicon to current debate: ‘alternative facts’, ‘fake news’, ‘enemies of the people’, 
‘failing media’.28 President Trump’s Twitter stream is a source of unbridled denunciations of 
mainstream media coverage, the Washington ‘elite’ and his critics and investigators. In the UK, 
fabrications during the 2016 referendum campaign – notoriously, how money saved by leaving 
the EU might be spent on the National Health Service – gave local substance to so-called ‘post-
truth politics’, which continues to flourish as we stand on the edge of the Brexit cliff. But post-
truth is more than a smart slogan. As Peter Dahlgren notes, it’s part of ‘an emerging epistemic 
regime, where emotional response prevails over evidence and factual analysis.’29  
  
The politics of expertise  
An effective public sphere depends on knowledgeable political actors of all kinds. So current 
attacks on ‘experts’ are very significant. Experts have no unqualified right to command public 
credibility, and as William Davies points out, sometimes it’s hard to distinguish insider experts 
from politicians; together they may occupy an elite world, quite distant from the travails of 
citizens’ everyday lives.30 But that is not the only issue. It’s that expertise and evidence as such 
have become objects of attack. For us, as academics, this is a serious political and professional 
matter. 
 
During the EU referendum campaign, one truncated sentence uttered by the British politician 
Michael Gove went viral as anti-expert discourse: ‘People in this country have had enough of 
experts.’31 Mr Gove targeted economists who’d pointed out the risks of leaving the EU. Critical 
ripostes from establishment experts at the Bank of England, the Royal Society, and the Foreign 
Office proved ineffective. Other attacks on experts dismissed civil service impartiality on the 
economy and denounced members of the UK Supreme Court as ‘enemies of the people’.  
 
Any claim to expertise depends on knowledge-producers observing credible practices. In short, 
expert status must be earned. A problem arises, though, when expert knowledge is dismissed 
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altogether. The sociologist Harry Collins has called this the use of ‘contrary expertise’ – the 
idea that research-based knowledge is just another opinion, and mine is as good as yours, 
whatever evidence you produce.32 
 
Anti-expert discourse is a major concern for the academic community. Europe’s national 
academies of the sciences and humanities now acknowledge growing public unwillingness to 
trust academic expertise. By taking the affective dimension of public reception seriously, the 
academies propose to make arguments and evidence more accessible through narratives and 
dialogues.33 Will this work? 
 
Keith Kahn-Harris has analysed hard cases to illustrate the depth of the problem. These include 
entrenched denial of evidence that the Holocaust took place, as well as the blanket rejection of 
scientific findings on anthropogenic global warming. Kahn-Harris has concluded that evidence 
simply does not counteract the resistance that’s put up by what he calls ‘denialism’.34 
Moreover, such ‘denialism’ may today be enhanced by how social media conduce to filter 
bubbles and echo chambers in what Natali Helberger calls the ‘privately controlled public 
spheres’ of social media platforms.35 
 
If expertise and evidence are readily discountable in democratic debate, and conspiracy 
theories, faked news stories, and mere opinion are treated as having truth value, this has major 
consequences for how we think about political discourse, human agency, and the future of 
public spheres. Is it still possible to deliberate generally about the common good?  
 
This, in turn, raises questions about how the production, circulation and uses of knowledge and 
information are organised and the efficacy of practical remedies for the ‘fake news’ agenda. 
Engaging in ‘fact checking’, challenging false statements, improving the public’s media 
literacy, and the like, have all been proposed. The LSE’s Truth Commission recently detailed 
a wide range of possible interventions, including setting up new monitoring and research 
capability with, if need be, statutory regulation as the backstop.36 Regulation is increasingly 
seen by policy-makers as a way of addressing the crisis of the public sphere. The regulatory 
activism of the EU regarding fake news, data protection and digital taxation is a case in point. 
So too, in the UK, is the regulator Ofcom’s nudge to public service broadcasters – to coalesce 
to combat Netflix and other extra-territorial platforms, and thus save national audiovisual 
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production. We may reasonably doubt that the competition policies presently in vogue are 
adequate to the task.  
 
Scotland’s dualistic public sphere 
Finally, a few thoughts on Scotland – or why the idea of a national public sphere isn’t quite so 
simple. Scotland is a distinct polity in the UK. The Acts of Union of 1707 incorporated it into 
a multi-national state with England, in which Scotland retained considerable autonomy from 
the start.37 Scotland has therefore long had a dualistic public sphere and a media landscape in 
which the British and the Scottish are co-present.38  
 
In these parts, since devolution in 1999, the re-establishment of a Scottish Parliament and the 
creation of a Scottish Government, we’ve been ever-more deeply immersed in the politics of 
nationhood. The ‘constitutional question’ asks whether or not Scotland should stay in the 
United Kingdom and if so, on what terms. That matter is not closed. Here, it shapes our 
everyday life. In 2014, during the independence campaign, the Scottish public sphere was 
passionately Scotland–centred. In 2019, for the third year running, it’s overwhelmingly UK-
centred. Because Brexit has crowded out Scottish matters in public debate. And this tells us 
much about the vagaries of a dualistic public sphere in a multi-national state. 
 
Scotland’s 2014 was the key fore-runner to the EU referendum campaign of 2016. Nothing 
was learned by the British political class from our experience. The lessons of 2014 should have 
persuaded our rulers to take due care when calling the EU membership referendum. 
Constitutions aren’t playthings. What we knew about the risks was blithely ignored.  
 
Caledonia today is doubly divided. We’re politically and socially riven between those Scots 
who still want independence and those who still don’t. But we’re also Ukanians, to use Tom 
Nairn’s term, facing Brexit along with all the other Brits, and split again between those who 
want in, or want out, of the EU.39  
 
For the past 20 years, devolution has supplied the institutional contours of Scotland’s public 
sphere. It was enacted when the UK was firmly inside the EU. The Brexit issue has 
overwhelmed the Scottish communicative space and marginalised the Scottish political voice 
in the UK. It has also raised many questions about the future of the present devolution 
settlement. Whatever happens next, Scotland won’t be dull.  
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A last word 
This lecture is part of work in progress. In a nutshell, I’ve argued that the public sphere is still 
important as a concept, heuristic focus, and space for thinking about the mediation and general 
practice of democratic politics. It’s always structured in power and therefore a site of conflict. 
In her astute analysis of the political philosophy of emotions, Martha Nussbaum has observed 
the widespread neglect in cultivating our capacity for understanding, taking time and care to 
deliberate, to show respect for others. This neglect opens the door to what she calls the 
‘monarchy of fear’.40 Recognising this, we do need to think afresh about the challenges plainly 
faced by a once-dominant model of deliberation and political rationality.41  
 
Those who successfully articulate a dominant vision of what the nation is, what it could be, 
and what it ought not to be, possess immense cultural power. The question of collective identity 
is presently the heart-beat of the public sphere of representative democracies. How could it not 
be central to our research agenda? 
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